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Assessment of Damages for Defamation of Business and Personal Reputation 
An award of damages for defamation is to provide reparation for harm to a plaintiff’s 
reputation for the publication of defamatory material, compensate for any personal distress 
caused and vindicate the plaintiff’s reputation.1  Assessing such damages is recognised as a 
difficult task and perhaps the Queensland courts face further difficulties as there are few 
awards of damages for defamation in the state. This was pointed out in the recent decision 
of the Queensland Court of Appeal, Cerutti & Anor v Crestside Pty Ltd & Anor.2 This decision 
examined in detail the principles of assessing damages for defamation.   
The facts were, briefly, that the respondents published defamatory imputations about the 
appellants, an accountant and his firm, to three entities, including the relevant professional 
body.  The appellants succeeded in their action of defamation and the respondents, former 
clients, were ordered to pay $7 000 in damages to the accountant and $5 000 to the 
accounting firm, each amount including a sum for aggravated damages.  On appeal the 
appellant argued that the ward was manifestly inadequate and that the trial judge had erred 
in refusing to award interest.3  The respondents argued that the claim of defamation should 
have been dismissed as there was no proof of financial loss, and further, the jury should 
have found that certain imputations were in fact true. 
Trial Decision 
The trial judge noted that the publication of the serious defamatory imputations was limited 
and there was ‘no suggestion that the dispute or the publication became known in the town 
of Ingham or had any effect on the plaintiff’s business’.4 Further, it had to be taken into 
account that amongst the defamatory imputations were other imputations, less serious, 
that the jury found to be substantially true.  It was held that aggravated damages were 
warranted in the circumstances as the respondents had asserted the truth of all imputations 
until nearly the conclusion of the trial and had acted maliciously in publishing the material. 
Principles of Assessment 
Applegarth J delivered the judgment of the Appeal Court, Margaret McMurdo P and 
Gotterson JA agreeing with his reasons and orders.  At [25]-[26] his Honour stated the 
principles of assessment: 
An award of general damages for defamation serves three purposes.5 It provides 
reparation for the harm done to the personal and, if applicable, business reputation 
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of the person defamed. It gives consolation for the personal distress and hurt caused 
to the plaintiff by the publication. It also serves to vindicate the plaintiff’s reputation. 
The first two purposes are frequently considered together. Vindication looks to the 
attitude of others: the sum awarded must be ‘at least the minimum necessary to 
signal to the public the vindication of the appellant’s reputation’.6 
These three purposes ‘no doubt overlap considerably in reality’.7  A single amount is 
awarded by way of reparation, consolation and vindication. 
Section 35 of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) requires that there be ‘an appropriate and 
rational relationship between the harm sustained by the plaintiff and the amount of 
damages awarded’. In Roberts v Prendergast8 it was held that ‘harm sustained by the 
plaintiff’ covers the three purposes for which general damages for defamation are awarded 
as at common law.   
Unlike the action of negligence, a plaintiff need not provide evidence that people think less 
of them because of the defamation, as there is a presumption that upon publication of 
defamatory material there is harm to reputation.9 As for the personal distress and hurt of a 
plaintiff, Applegrth J referred to Lord Diplock’s statement in Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome10that 
such harm often relates more to the plaintiff’s perception of what others are thinking of 
them rather than any noticeable change in attitude towards them.11 Vindication requires 
that the damages awarded ‘must be sufficient to convince a person to whom the publication 
was made or to whom it has spread along the grapevine of ‘the baselessness of the 
charge’’.12 
Aggravated damages for defamation may be awarded if a defendant has conducted 
themselves in an improper or unjustifiable way that affects the plaintiff’s reputation.13  
Section 38 of the Queensland Defamation Act 2005 provides that a court may take into 
account various matters that may mitigate the award of damages, for example, an apology 
or the proof that one or more of the imputations were substantially true. 
Applying the Principles 
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Upon publication of the defamatory material it was presumed that the appellant, Cerutti, 
suffered some damage to his reputation.  Applegarth J held that as the appellant was a 
professional and the nature of the defamation, vindication was of importance as the 
‘unjustified imputations in this case included imputations which reflected upon the 
professional reputations and honesty of the [appellants]’.14  His Honour stated: 
The total award needed to be in an amount which served to vindicate reputation by 
signalling that the imputations which the respondents tried and failed to justify were 
in fact untrue.15 
Applegarth J held that it was appropriate that the award of general damages,  before taking 
into account other matters, was between $15 000 and $30 000.16 His Honour held that the 
trial judge had erred in discounting the general damages by 50 per cent to take into account 
the fact that two imputations were found to be substantially true.17  It was noted that a 
comparison could not be made with the facts of this case to Hallam v Ross (No 2)18 in which 
the plaintiff was defamed in two emails, the second email containing two imputations that 
were substantially true.  The imputations in that case were of criminality and that the 
plaintiff was a liar and dishonest.  In contrast, in the case before the Court of Appeal, the 
respondents had been motivated by malice and the imputations found to be substantially 
true were less serious than those which had been found to be defamatory.  Applegarth J 
stated: 
The imputations which were found to be untrue were apt to do far more harm than 
the imputations which were found to be true. If the successfully defended 
imputations had not been conveyed then, I infer Mr Cerutti’s upset, embarrassment 
and distress would not have been much less. In the circumstances, it would have 
been appropriate to discount a damages award to Mr Cerutti by no more than 25 per 
cent on account of the imputations which were proved to be true, not by 50 per 
cent. 
As the trial judge had erred in the provisional assessment of damages and in discounting the 
award by 50 per cent, Applegarth J was convinced that the award was manifestly 
inadequate.19 
In regards to the second appellant, the accounting firm, it was noted that it could not 
recover damages for defamatory imputations of the personal reputation of the partners.20  
In defamation a partnership may claim damages for imputations that reflect upon its own 
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reputation.21  Applegarth J stated that the respondents’ argument that as the firm had not 
produced evidence of loss due to the publication there was no action, had no merit, and 
held: 
A letter which accuses an accounting firm of dishonest practices and intending to 
deceive a client defames it, thereby entitling the firm to sue for damages for 
defamation. In accordance with the general principles discussed above governing 
damages for defamation, the firm does not need to prove that it has suffered actual 
economic loss. Publication of a defamatory imputation about it is the gist of the 
action. However the absence of evidence of actual injury to its reputation because, 
for example, its goodwill was damaged, it lost customers or lost commercial 
opportunities, may result in a moderate or even nominal award of damages22 
His Honour noted that the publications had not been made to any the firm’s customers, but 
had been made to the professional bodies.  His Honour thought that the damages should be 
moderate in such circumstances but the trial judge had erred by starting at $7 000 and 
discounting by 50 per cent was excessive.23 
As for the claim for interest which had not been allowed by the trial judge because it was a 
moderate amount of damages being awarded, there was a long and unexplained delay in 
bringing the proceedings and the appellants had not proven any actual loss.  Appplegarth J 
held that the judge was incorrect in relying upon the fact that it was only a moderate 
amount of damages,24 and the fact that the damages were vindication damages did not 
preclude an award of interest and should have been awarded unless there were good 
reasons not to.25 The defamation took place in 2006 and the matter did not proceed to trial 
until 2013, the appellants having to bring and application for leave to proceed in 2011 as no 
action had been taken for some time.  Applegarth J held that delay may justify reduction in 
the period of interest but not a refusal to award any interest.26  On the facts before the 
Appeal Court it was determined that the delay was not due to ‘an indifference of the effect 
of the publication upon the [appellants’] reputation’ but there had been delay which 
justified interest to be awarded over a period of five years instead of almost seven.27 It was 
pointed out that it was understandable for there to be a delay in a plaintiff bringing an 
action in defamation where the publication was to a limited audience as it raised the 
possibility of publication to more people.28 
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The appeals against the amount of damages and the refusal to award interest were allowed 
by the Queensland Court of Appeal and the judgment varied to award the appellant 
accountant $20 000 plus interest and the firm $10 000 and interest. 
Conclusion 
The decision of Cerutti & Anor v Crestside Pty Ltd & Anor provides an overview of the 
principles of assessment of damages for injury to reputation.  Although defamation is an 
action on the case and requires damage, unlike an action in negligence it is presumed that 
damage is suffered upon the publication of defamatory material.  Although it is not clear 
that this is an irrebuttable presumption,29 it is evidence of other matters that a defendant 
will need to rely upon in order to argue against a significant award, for example, limited 
publication or the substantial truth of other imputations being proved that are of similar 
weight and effect. 
It is common for courts to take note of comparable judgements in defamation cases when 
considering what is the appropriate award of damages.  As noted, there is not a large body 
of decisions that award damages for defamation in Queensland and as Applegarth J points 
out, how is a court to compare, for example, ‘an imputation of criminality or dishonesty, 
communicated to a limited number of people, with a less serious defamation communicated 
to a far greater number?’30 However reference to decisions in other jurisdictions on a broad 
comparison may be useful to contrast, as was done in this case. 
 
Amanda Stickley 
Senior Lecturer 
QUT, Law Faculty 
                                                          
29
 In Bristow v Adams [2012] NSWCA 166, Basten JA found it not necessary to answer this issue when analysing 
the authorities supporting the proposition that damage is presumed in defamation. 
30
 Cerutti & Anor v Crestside Pty Ltd & Anor [2014] QCA 33, [48]. 
